Maxwell House philosophy is to perfect their coffee harvesting process so that its cost could be reduced further for increased customer affordability. This most likely reflects the .

Because this market is a monopolistically competitive market, you can tell that it is in long-run equilibrium by the fact thatmr=mc at the optimal quantity for each firm. furthermore, a monopolistically competitive firm's average total cost in long-run equilibrium isless than the minimum average total cost. true or false: this indicates that there is a markup on marginal cost in the market for engines. true false monopolistic competition may also be socially inefficient because there are too many or too few firms in the market. the presence of the externality implies that there is too little entry of new firms in the market.

Gyou are in charge of making the work schedule for the next two weeks. typically this is not a difficult task as you work at a routine 8am – 5pm company. however, over the next two weeks you are required to schedule someone to be in the office each saturday. after contemplating this for a few days you make the schedule and assignments. before posting the schedule for everyone you decide that it is a good idea to meet personally with the two people you have scheduled to work the weekend. what do you say to them? what is your desired outcome?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?