Owners of the business who contribute money to the business take more risk than creditors who loan money to the business. this statement is:

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

On average, someone with a bachelor's degree is estimated to earn times more than someone with a high school diploma. a)1.2 b)1.4 c)1.6 d)1.8

Suppose portugal has 700 workers and 26,000 units of capital, and france has 18,000 workers and 700 units of capital. technology is identical in both countries. assume that wine is the capital-intensive good and cloth is the labor-intensive good. which of the following statements is correct if the nations start trading with each other? a) wages will increase in portugal.b) rental rates in france will increase.c) wages in france will decrease.d) rental rates in portugal will increase.