Three roommateslong dashtinker, evers, and chancelong dashshare an apartment. it is really cold outside and they are considering turning up the thermostat in the apartment by 1, 2, 3, or 4 degrees. their individual marginal benefits from making it warmer in the apartment are as follows:
- tinker evers chance
1 degree $20 $16 $12
2 degrees $16 $12 $8
3 degrees $12 $8 $4
4 degrees $8 $4 $0
they know that each time they raise the temperature in the apartment by 1 degree, their heating bill goes up by $32.
to maximize social benefit, they should raise the temperature by

Why is the cournot equilibrium an​ equilibrium? a. there are​ short-run barriers to exit in a cournot​ duopoly, so both firms cannot alter their output levels. b. given the other​ firm's level of​ production, both firms are maximizing profits and cannot improve their situation by unilaterally altering their level of output. c. both firms operate at zero profit under a cournot​ equilibrium, so they would face negative profits if they change output. d. both firms operate at minimum​ long-run average cost under a cournot​ equilibrium, so changes to output would reduce​ long-run profits. even if they​ can't collude, why​ don't firms set their outputs at the joint​ profit-maximizing levels​ (i.e., the levels they would have chosen had they​ colluded)? a. given that other firm produces at the collusive​ level, a firm could increase their own profits by increasing output above the collusive level. b. the midpoint of the collusion curve​ (i.e., the collusive​ outcome) lies below the reaction​ curves, so both firms have an incentive to increase output under the cournot duopoly. c. both a and b are correct d. both a and b are incorrect