What does the story of tambuli show about the barrio?

Rice fields below. To his ears came the sound of the tambuli, long and mellow. Three times it sounded and he knew that it was Kuya Endong who was blowing the horn, calling back the carabaos and cattle from beyond the creek.
How he longed to have a horn which he could call his own- one which he could carry along with him and show to his friends and playmates! He had long dreamed of having one which he could blow as much as he wished. But his father had time again said that he was too young to own a tambuli. To the hill people, the tambuli was a precious piece of property. They used it for gathering their domestic animals together, and, on stormy nights, in locating a lost or belated member of the family.
He recalled the day when he received a severe scolding and spanking from his father on account of a tambuli. He had sneaked into his father’s bedroom and, placing a chair near the wall and standing tiptoe on it, had reached for the tambuli which was hanging from a bamboo peg. He had carefully taken it down and out of the house, and, once in the field, began blowing it with all his might. The sound which he produced scared the carabaos and caused them to run away instead of gathering them together. His father, coming home from the cockfight, caught him unaware, and putting him over his knees, beat him till he shouted for mercy. He was then given a long sermon and made to promise not to touch the tambuli again.
But Nanoy was not daunted by this. So strong was the fascination of the tambuli over him that the spankings and the warnings did not deter him from learning how to blow it properly. HE continu4ed to go to his father’s room and g
“I was just dork, for his father was a believer in the need of preparing children for the struggle for existence early in life. How skillfully he helped remove the hide! How adept he was in cutting! His hands were guided by the great purpose brewing in his mind.
At last the work was ended. The beef had been distributed among the different members of th
Nanoy did not wait for a second command. He was off, and in a moment

As citizens grow increasingly wary of whose interests are being represented in the public policy arena, especially in light of recent sensational scandals showing a cozy relationship between professional lobbyists and lawmakers, a crisis of confidence is engulfing many democratic societies across the european and north american continents. public perceptions of undue influence peddling, in which special interest groups exercise too much sway over government for self-serving purposes, have led to growing demands for the regulation of lobbyists and transparency of the policymaking process. the united states and canada have been struggling for decades to refine their systems of lobbyist regulation. of all the shortcomings of the north american model of lobbyist regulation – and there are many – transparency is not, for the most part, one of them. many european countries have also been experimenting with systems of lobbyist regulation. until recently, however, the european national experiments have produced very different results among themselves and in comparison with the north american counterparts. surprisingly, some of the earliest efforts to regulate lobbying occurred among new democratic countries in eastern europe rather than the more advanced industrial democracies of western europe. this observation stands in stark contrast to the north american experience, where lobbyist regulation emerged as an effort to manage a highly developed class of professional lobbyists within the strictures of long-standing democratic principles. the authors find that the answer to this anomaly lies in the fact that early european lobbyist regulations focused not on  transparency  as a means to regain public confidence in government, but on providing business interests with  access  to lawmakers as a means to bolster fledgling economies. this focus on access is quickly giving way to demands for transparency as many european governments, racked by scandal, are striving to salvage the public's trust. propelled largely by example from a reluctant european parliament and commission, which are themselves attempting to convince europe that a regional government is in its own interest, several european countries are beginning to make a transition from weak systems of lobbyist regulation, which emphasize business access, to strong systems of lobbyist regulation, which emphasize public transparency. in order to discern ‘best’ practices for achieving transparency through lobbying regulation, the authors first chart the regulatory systems of the united states and canada. that is followed by an analysis of all of the european lobbying regimes. the oft-expressed objection to this new trend toward transparency in europe – that professional lobbyists view such regulations as overly burdensome – is undercut by research on european and american lobbyists’ attitudes toward regulation, which are generally quite favorable. like everyone else, lobbyists realize that they have an image problem and that the best way to address that problem is by operating in the broad daylight of public transparency. finally, the authors offer recommendations on how to enhance transparency in policymaking, drawing from detailed comparisons of the north american and european models of lobbyist regulation.