a 16-year-old male suspect is detained and questioned by his school principal regarding drugs found in his school locker. the boy confesses to supplying small quantities of drugs to a few friends. the boy and the drugs are turned over to juvenile detectives. the principal advises the juvenile detectives of the boy's confession. the detectives transport the juvenile to the police station where he is placed in a juvenile interview room. the detectives are familiar with the juvenile as he has two prior arrests for theft. the detectives attempt to reach the juvenile's parents without success. the juvenile detectives provide the boy with his miranda warning which he indicates that he understands. he is then questioned regarding the drugs and from whom he has been obtaining the drugs to sell at school. the juvenile repeats his previous confession he gave to the principal. he remains silent in response to questions regarding who his supplier is stating "i'm not a snitch. i am not talking about anyone else." the detectives then advise him that another high school student overdosed and died from the same drugs he was dealing. he stops speaking other than to repeatedly ask to speak with his parents. the boy's parents arrive at headquarters three hours later and tell him not to answer any more questions. the suspect is charged on juvenile delinquency complaints for the possession and distribution of drugs on school property. he is released to his parents pending his court appearance.
suppose four detectives continue to question the juvenile even after his repeated requests to speak with his parents. he is kept from his parents in excess of 12 hours, and denied a break from questioning. the detectives tell him that they have enough evidence to charge him for the death of the other student and unless he confesses he will go directly to jail and not see his parents. the continued pressure results in his confession, implicating him in the death of an overdosed high school student. would the juvenile's confession be considered voluntary?

As citizens grow increasingly wary of whose interests are being represented in the public policy arena, especially in light of recent sensational scandals showing a cozy relationship between professional lobbyists and lawmakers, a crisis of confidence is engulfing many democratic societies across the european and north american continents. public perceptions of undue influence peddling, in which special interest groups exercise too much sway over government for self-serving purposes, have led to growing demands for the regulation of lobbyists and transparency of the policymaking process. the united states and canada have been struggling for decades to refine their systems of lobbyist regulation. of all the shortcomings of the north american model of lobbyist regulation – and there are many – transparency is not, for the most part, one of them. many european countries have also been experimenting with systems of lobbyist regulation. until recently, however, the european national experiments have produced very different results among themselves and in comparison with the north american counterparts. surprisingly, some of the earliest efforts to regulate lobbying occurred among new democratic countries in eastern europe rather than the more advanced industrial democracies of western europe. this observation stands in stark contrast to the north american experience, where lobbyist regulation emerged as an effort to manage a highly developed class of professional lobbyists within the strictures of long-standing democratic principles. the authors find that the answer to this anomaly lies in the fact that early european lobbyist regulations focused not on  transparency  as a means to regain public confidence in government, but on providing business interests with  access  to lawmakers as a means to bolster fledgling economies. this focus on access is quickly giving way to demands for transparency as many european governments, racked by scandal, are striving to salvage the public's trust. propelled largely by example from a reluctant european parliament and commission, which are themselves attempting to convince europe that a regional government is in its own interest, several european countries are beginning to make a transition from weak systems of lobbyist regulation, which emphasize business access, to strong systems of lobbyist regulation, which emphasize public transparency. in order to discern ‘best’ practices for achieving transparency through lobbying regulation, the authors first chart the regulatory systems of the united states and canada. that is followed by an analysis of all of the european lobbying regimes. the oft-expressed objection to this new trend toward transparency in europe – that professional lobbyists view such regulations as overly burdensome – is undercut by research on european and american lobbyists’ attitudes toward regulation, which are generally quite favorable. like everyone else, lobbyists realize that they have an image problem and that the best way to address that problem is by operating in the broad daylight of public transparency. finally, the authors offer recommendations on how to enhance transparency in policymaking, drawing from detailed comparisons of the north american and european models of lobbyist regulation.