Abusinesswoman entered into a written contract with a general contractor to build a studio and broadcast transmitter for $3 million by july 1. among his tasks, the contractor was to install underground cables and fiberoptic lines necessary to broadcast. when digging the deep trench necessary to lay the conduit containing the fiberoptic lines, the contractor encountered a stretch of extremely soggy soil. this was an indication that an offshoot of the nearby city's aquifer underlay the property. this was not indicated on any of the geological survey maps available in the office of the county recorder of deeds. the contractor told the businesswoman that it would cost an additional $50,000 to lay the conduit through that stretch of soil. the businesswoman had already launched an advertising campaign indicating that the station would begin broadcasting on july 4, which was rapidly approaching. therefore, when the contractor threatened to quit the job without the additional $50,000, the businesswoman reluctantly agreed orally to the contractor's demand as long as he promised that all of the work would be completed by the middle of june. the contractor agreed, proceeded to lay the conduit, and completed building the studio and transmitter by june 15. the businesswoman paid the contractor $3 million, but when the contractor demanded $50,000 more, she refused to pay it. the contractor sues the businesswoman for the $50,000.who will prevail? a the businesswoman, because the oral modification was not effective to alter the prior written agreement. b the businesswoman, because no valid consideration was provided for the agreement to pay the additional $50,000.c the contractor, because the modification was supported by consideration. d the contractor, because he detrimentally relied on the businesswoman's promise to pay the additional $50,000.

The answer is closed primary.

As citizens grow increasingly wary of whose interests are being represented in the public policy arena, especially in light of recent sensational scandals showing a cozy relationship between professional lobbyists and lawmakers, a crisis of confidence is engulfing many democratic societies across the european and north american continents. public perceptions of undue influence peddling, in which special interest groups exercise too much sway over government for self-serving purposes, have led to growing demands for the regulation of lobbyists and transparency of the policymaking process. the united states and canada have been struggling for decades to refine their systems of lobbyist regulation. of all the shortcomings of the north american model of lobbyist regulation – and there are many – transparency is not, for the most part, one of them. many european countries have also been experimenting with systems of lobbyist regulation. until recently, however, the european national experiments have produced very different results among themselves and in comparison with the north american counterparts. surprisingly, some of the earliest efforts to regulate lobbying occurred among new democratic countries in eastern europe rather than the more advanced industrial democracies of western europe. this observation stands in stark contrast to the north american experience, where lobbyist regulation emerged as an effort to manage a highly developed class of professional lobbyists within the strictures of long-standing democratic principles. the authors find that the answer to this anomaly lies in the fact that early european lobbyist regulations focused not on  transparency  as a means to regain public confidence in government, but on providing business interests with  access  to lawmakers as a means to bolster fledgling economies. this focus on access is quickly giving way to demands for transparency as many european governments, racked by scandal, are striving to salvage the public's trust. propelled largely by example from a reluctant european parliament and commission, which are themselves attempting to convince europe that a regional government is in its own interest, several european countries are beginning to make a transition from weak systems of lobbyist regulation, which emphasize business access, to strong systems of lobbyist regulation, which emphasize public transparency. in order to discern ‘best’ practices for achieving transparency through lobbying regulation, the authors first chart the regulatory systems of the united states and canada. that is followed by an analysis of all of the european lobbying regimes. the oft-expressed objection to this new trend toward transparency in europe – that professional lobbyists view such regulations as overly burdensome – is undercut by research on european and american lobbyists’ attitudes toward regulation, which are generally quite favorable. like everyone else, lobbyists realize that they have an image problem and that the best way to address that problem is by operating in the broad daylight of public transparency. finally, the authors offer recommendations on how to enhance transparency in policymaking, drawing from detailed comparisons of the north american and european models of lobbyist regulation.

The correct answer is "bantu".