Two players: The employee (Raquel) and the employer (Vera). Raquel has to choose whether to pursue training that costs $1,000 to herself or not.

Vera has to decide whether to pay a fixed wage of $10,000 to Raquel or share the revenues of the enterprise 50:50 with Raquel.

The output is positively affected by both training and revenue sharing. Indeed, with no training and a fixed wage total output is $20,000, while if either training or profit sharing is implemented the output rises to $22,000. If both training and revenue sharing are implemented the output is $25,000.

a. Construct the pay-off matrix.

b. Is there a dominant strategy for Raquel? Why or why not?

c. Is there a dominant strategy for Vera? Why or why not?

d. Find the Nash equilibrium.

you save $70

discount would be 35% off

step-by-step explanation:

20

step-by-step explanation:

assuming you meant there are 24 pounds of apples in each case, if this is not what you meant, correct me so i can you further

asnwer is (g o h o f)(x) = 2x - 6/x + 7

step-by-step explanation:

given,

f(x) = x - 3/x

g(x) = x + 3

h(x) = 2x + 1

we need to find : (g o h o f)(x)

we can write (g o h o f)(x) = g[ h{ f(x) } ]

so first we find h{f(x)}

h{f(x)} = f(x) + 3 = (x - 3/x) + 3

h{f(x)} = x - 3/x + 3

now we find g[ h{ f(x) } ].

g[ h{ f(x) } ] = g(x - 3/x + 3)       {plug h{f(x)} = x - 3/x + 3 in g[h{f(x)}] }

g(x - 3/x + 3) = 2 (x - 3/x + 3) + 1

                    = 2x - 6/x + 6 + 1

                    = 2x - 6/x + 7

hence we get (g o h o f)(x) = 2x - 6/x + 7