Using this: Two distinct but linked questions are always asked about the impact that Portugal made in the Indian Ocean between the arrival of Vasco da Gama and the death of Albuquerque. First, how was it possible for Portugal, so poor, small, weak and distant, to capture great cities like Ormuz, Goa and Malacca and to lay the western Indian Ocean under tribute, successfully defying the powerful kingdoms of Asia and the Middle East. The second question, asked in partial answer to the first, is whether Portugal's impact on Asia was really as great as a reading of the chroniclers might lead one to suppose. The second of these questions will be examined in the last chapter of this book, but a consideration of the first needs to form an epilogue to any account of the era of da Gama, Almeida and Albuquerque.

Most historians have agreed that Portugal arrived in the Indian Ocean at a moment uniquely favourable for themselves. The great land-based powers of the East—the Delhi sultanate, Hindu Vijayanagar, Persian, imperial China, and the Ottoman empire were all preoccupied with political struggles deep within the continental land masses. Warfare in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean had closed the overland spice routes at the end of the fifteenth century. The seaborne commerce of the Indian Ocean was handled by port-city states which were largely independent of the mainland powers which derived little of their income from maritime commerce. Indeed imperial China had closed its ports to outside trade altogether. It has therefore been argued that the great Asiatic powers simply ignored the arrival of the Portuguese until the latter were too firmly established to be easily dislodged.

The second explanation, particularly advanced by G. V. Scammell, is that, from the start, the Portuguese were able to exploit local rivalries and came to rely heavily on the collaboration of local allies. The rivalries came to rely heavily on the collaboration of local allies. The rivalry of Melinde with Mombasa in eastern Africa, or Cochin with Calicut on the Malabar coast, are two obvious cases. Almost from the start the Portuguese began to recruit local soldiers and seamen to supplement their shortage of manpower. According to this argument, the Portuguese victories were won with the aid of collaborators and by using the tactics of divide and rule—and not by any superior military or naval capacity. It was an argument developed to counter the claims made by Carlo Cipolla that it was the armed warship with its heavy artillery that gave Portugal an overwhelming military advantage.

The role of gunpowder in the story of European overseas expansion is not to be easily dismissed and remains an important line of argument, especially for those who believe that global capitalism has triumphed not by the logic of the market but too often by the logic of the gun. The Portuguese commanders themselves attached a great deal of importance to firearms and were determined to be properly supplied with guns and experienced artillerymen—Albuquerque even recommended to Dom Manuel that half the gunners in the fortresses in the East should be Germans who had a reputation for being the best gunners of the age, and gave permission for a German chapel to be built in Goa. Morocco had been the school and testing ground for a particularly successful type of warfare. The Portuguese attacks on Moroccan ports in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries had been amphibious operations. By moving their forces by sea the Portuguese found that they could achieve surprise and concentrate their forces rapidly at one particular point. Moreover, as Cipolla pointed out, the ships could carry heavy guns which could be easily and rapidly manoeuvred into position.


1. Summarize the author’s argument and supporting evidence.
2. Why was Portugal successful in Asia? Be sure to amplify the author’s argument as you explain your answer.