Which term refers to the practice in which government workers leave public positions and go to work for interest groups?

Now ray has had the tires for two months and he notices that the tread has started to pull away from the tire. he has already contacted the place who sold the tires and calmly and accurately explained the problem. they didn’t him because they no longer carry that tire. so he talked with the manager and he still did not get the tire replaced. his consumer rights are being violated. pretend you are ray and write a letter to the company’s headquarters. here are some points to keep in mind when writing the letter: include your name, address, and account number, if appropriate. describe your purchase (name of product, serial numbers, date and location of purchase). state the problem and give the history of how you tried to resolve the problem. ask for a specific action. include how you can be reached.

Until recently, hamburgers at the city sports arena cost $4.70 each. the food concessionaire sold an average of 13 comma 000 hamburgers on game night. when the price was raised to $5.40, hamburger sales dropped off to an average of 6 comma 000 per night. (a) assuming a linear demand curve, find the price of a hamburger that will maximize the nightly hamburger revenue. (b) if the concessionaire had fixed costs of $1 comma 500 per night and the variable cost is $0.60 per hamburger, find the price of a hamburger that will maximize the nightly hamburger profit.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?