When selecting a training mode, novices should begin with?

The master manufacturing company has just announced a tender offer for its own common stock. master is offering to buy up to 100% of the company's stock at $20 per share contingent on at least 64% of the outstanding shares being tendered. after the announcement of the offer, the stock closed on the nyse up 2.50 at $18.75. a customer has 100 shares of master stock in his cash account. the customer tells you that he wishes to "cash out" his position. you should recommend that the customer:

Trade will take place: a. if the maximum that a consumer is willing and able to pay is less than the minimum price the producer is willing and able to accept for a good. b. if the maximum that a consumer is willing and able to pay is greater than the minimum price the producer is willing and able to accept for a good. c. only if the maximum that a consumer is willing and able to pay is equal to the minimum price the producer is willing and able to accept for a good. d. none of the above.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?