Milton friedman argued that consumers are more likely to alter their behavior based on.

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

Cynthia is a hospitality worker in the lodging industry who prefers to cater to small groups of people. she might want to open a

Mark knopf is an auditor who has been asked to provide an audit and financial statement certification for a company that is going public on the new york stock exchange. knopf wants to know his personal liability if the company provides him with inaccurate or false information. which of the following sources of law will him answer that question? a. the city ordinances where the company headquarters is located. b. the state constitution of the state where the company is incorporated. c. code of federal regulations. d. all of the above