According to the book Building and Growing a Business Through Good Times and Bad, companies with 100 years of consistent dividends:

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

> > objectives define federalism and explain why the framers adopted a federal system instead of a unitary system. categorize powers delegated to and denied to the national government, and powers reserved for and denied to the states, and the difference between exclusive and concurrent powers.

Pam is a low-risk careful driver and fran is a high-risk aggressive driver. to reveal their driver types, an auto-insurance company a. refuses to insure high-risk drivers b. charges a higher premium to owners of newer cars than to owners of older cars c. offers policies that enable drivers to reveal their private information d. uses a pooling equilibrium e. requires drivers to categorize themselves as high-risk or low-risk on the application form