Business, 30.09.2021 20:30 jbk123

If you find erroneous information on your credit report, how can you make the necessary corrections?

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Business, 22.06.2019 18:30

Amanufacturer has paid an engineering firm $200,000 to design a new plant, and it will cost another $2 million to build the plant. in the meantime, however, the manufacturer has learned of a foreign company that offers to build an equivalent plant for $2,100,000. what should the manufacturer do?

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Business, 22.06.2019 21:20

Which of the following best explains why buying a house is more beneficial than renting? a. buying is a personal investment while renting involves giving money to the landlord. b. the monthly payments on a mortgage are generally lower than rent on an apartment. c. it's easier to sell a house than it is to get a landlord to break a rental agreement. d. housing prices can go up and down quickly in comparison to the level of rents.

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Business, 22.06.2019 22:20

David consumes two things: gasoline (q 1) and bread (q 2). david's utility function is u(q 1, q 2)equals70q 1 superscript 0.5 baseline q 2 superscript 0.5. let the price of gasoline be p 1, the price of bread be p 2, and income be y. derive david's demand curve for gasoline. david's demand for gasoline is q 1equals nothing. (properly format your expression using the tools in the palette. hover over tools to see keyboard shortcuts. e.g., a subscript can be created with the _ character.)

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Business, 23.06.2019 00:00

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?