I.)Name the document shown above
ii.)Nane two uses of the document​

1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10time remaining59: 30in  the dark game, how does the author develop the central idea that elizabeth van lew was a spymaster during the civil war? 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10time remaining59: 30in the dark game, how does the author develop the central idea that elizabeth van lew was a spymaster during the civil war?

Your team has identified the risks on the project and determined their risk score. the team is in the midst of determining what strategies to put in place should the risks occur. after some discussion, the team members have determined that the risk of losing their network administrator is a risk they'll just deal with if and when it occurs. although they think it's a possibility and the impact would be significant, they've decided to simply deal with it after the fact. which of the following is true regarding this question? a. this is a positive response strategy.b. this is a negative response strategy.c. this is a response strategy for either positive or negative risk known as contingency planning.d. this is a response strategy for either positive or negative risks known as passive acceptance.

Suppose that two firms produce differentiated products and compete in prices. as in class, the two firms are located at two ends of a line one mile apart. consumers are evenly distributed along the line. the firms have identical marginal cost, $60. firm b produces a product with value $110 to consumers.firm a (located at 0 on the unit line) produces a higher quality product with value $120 to consumers. the cost of travel are directly related to the distance a consumer travels to purchase a good. if a consumerhas to travel a mile to purchase a good, the incur a cost of $20. if they have to travel x fraction of a mile, they incur a cost of $20x. (a) write down the expressions for how much a consumer at location d would value the products sold by firms a and b, if they set prices p_{a} and p_{b} ? (b) based on your expressions in (a), how much will be demanded from each firm if prices p_{a} and p_{b} are set? (c) what are the nash equilibrium prices?