Would you please help me ? Thanks in advance You have four essentially identical extra tickets to the Midwest Regional Sweet 16 game in the men’s basketball tournament. The table shows the willingness to pay of the four potential buyers in the market for a ticket to the game.

Buyer Willingness to Pay
Michael $500
Earvin $400
Larry $350
Charles $300

1. If you offer to sell the tickets for $300, who will purchase the good?
a. Michael only
b. Michael and Earvin only
c. Earvin only
d. The four buyers will purchase the good.

(select all that apply) examples of email use that could be considered unethical include denying receiving an e-mail requesting that you work late forwarding a chain letter asking for donations to a good cause sending a quick message to your friend about last weekend sending your boss the monthly sales figures in an attachment setting up a meeting with your co-worker sharing a funny joke with other employees

Jacob is a member of wcc (an llc taxed as a partnership). jacob was allocated $155,000 of business income from wcc for the year. jacob’s marginal income tax rate is 37 percent. the business allocation is subject to 2.9 percent of self-employment tax and 0.9 percent additional medicare tax. (round your intermediate calculations to the nearest whole dollar a) what is the amount of tax jacob will owe on the income allocation if the income is not qualified business income? b) what is the amount of tax jacob will owe on the income allocation if the income is qualified business income (qbi) and jacob qualifies for the full qbi duduction?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?