g Assume you just purchased 100 shares of Apple stocks at $300. You are worrying that the competition from other tablet PC and smart phone producers will have a negative impact on Apple stock prices in 1 month. Generally speaking, you are still quite bullish on Apple stock. In order to hedge against this downside risk, you establish a protective put position by buying a put option contract with around 1-month maturity on Apple stock. However, the premium of the put option with strike price at $300 is $12, which is quite expensive. If you feel purchasing the put option with strike price at $300 and $12 premium is too expensive, what else can we do to reduce the cost of protective put position

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?