Examples of institutional investors are pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies.

a. true

b. false

What is private equity investing? who participates in it and why? how is palamon positioned in the industry? how does private equity investing compare with public market investing? what are the similarities and differences between the two? why is palamon interested in teamsystem? does it fit with palamon’s investment strategy? how much is 51% of teamsystem’s common equity worth? use both a discounted cash flow and a multiple-based valuation to justify your recommendation. what complexities do cross-border deals introduce? what are the specific risks of this deal? what should louis elson recommend to his partners? is it a go or not? if it is a go, what nonprice terms are important? if it’s not a go, what counterproposal would you make?

Miller company’s total sales are $171,000. the company’s direct labor cost is $20,520, which represents 30% of its total conversion cost and 40% of its total prime cost. its total selling and administrative expense is $25,650 and its only variable selling and administrative expense is a sales commission of 5% of sales. the company maintains no beginning or ending inventories and its manufacturing overhead costs are entirely fixed costs. required: 1. what is the total manufacturing overhead cost? 2. what is the total direct materials cost? 3. what is the total manufacturing cost? 4. what is the total variable selling and administrative cost? 5. what is the total variable cost? 6. what is the total fixed cost? 7. what is the total contribution margin?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?