Economic Systems Continuum Activity: Group Response Sheet Group Members: 1. United KingdomDescribe location on continuum Explain your reasoning 2. GermanyDescribe location on continuum Explain your reasoning 3. RussiaDescribe location on continuum Lei'Lani Jackson, Kimora Broughton, Kennedy Cooper and London Peters It is on the market side of the continum Explain your reasoning 4. AustraliaDescribe location on continuum Explain your reasoning 5. CubaDescribe location on continuum Explain your reasoning 6. BrazilDescribe location on continuum Explain your reasoning 7. CanadaDescribe location on continuum Explain your reasoning Amswers

At a student café, there are equal numbers of two types of customers with the following values. the café owner cannot distinguish between the two types of students because many students without early classes arrive early anyway (i.e., she cannot price-discriminate). students with early classes students without early classes coffee 70 60 banana 51 101 the marginal cost of coffee is 10 and the marginal cost of a banana is 40. the café owner is considering three pricing strategies: 1. mixed bundling: price bundle of coffee and a banana for 161, or just a coffee for 70. 2. price separately: offer coffee at 60, price a banana at 101. 3. bundle only: coffee and a banana for 121. do not offer goods separately. assume that if the price of an item or bundle is no more than exactly equal to a student's willingness to pay, then the student will purchase the item or bundle. for simplicity, assume there is just one student with an early class, and one student without an early class. price strategy revenue from pricing strategy cost from pricing strategy profit from pricing strategy 1. mixed bundling $ $ $ 2. price separately $ $ $ 3. bundle only $ $ $ pricing strategy yields the highest profit for the café owner.

Asap describe three different expenses associated with restaurants. choose one of these expenses, and discuss how a manager could handle this expense.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?