On day 1, Jackson, a merchant, mailed Sandy a signed letter that contained an offer to sell Sandy 500 electric fans at $10 per fan. The letter was received by Sandy on day 3. The letter contained a promise not to revoke the offer but no expiration date. On day 4, Jackson mailed Sandy a revocation of the offer to sell the fans. Sandy received the revocation on day 6. On day 7, Sandy mailed Jackson an acceptance of the offer. Jackson received the acceptance on day 9. Under the Sales Article of the UCC, was a contract formed

Tandard product costs deerfield company manufactures product m in its factory. production of m requires 2 pounds of material p, costing $4 per pound and 0.5 hour of direct labor costing, $10 per hour. the variable overhead rate is $8 per direct labor hour, and the fixed overhead rate is $12 per direct labor hour. what is the standard product cost for product m? direct material answer direct labor answer variable overhead answer fixed overhead answer standard product cost per unit answer

Indicate whether each of the following companies is primarily a service, merchandise, or manufacturing business. if you are unfamiliar with the company, use the internet to locate the company's home page or use the finance web site of yahoo. 1. alcoa inc. 2. boeing 3. caterpillar 4. citigroup inc. 5. cvs 6. dow chemical company 7. ebay inc. 8. fedex 9. ford motor company 10. gap inc. 11. h& r block 12. hilton hospitality, inc. 13. procter & gamble 14. suntrust 15. walmart stores, inc.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?