The Zakchari Company has six processing departments for refining sugar—Affination, Carbonation, Decolorization, Boiling, Recovery, and Packaging. Conversion costs are added evenly throughout each process, and materials are added at the beginning of each process. Data from August for the Recovery Department are as follows: ? Metric Tons Beginning Work-in-Process Inventory 3,000 Transferred In 18,500 Ending Work-in-Process Inventory 6,500 In August, 15,000 metric tons were completed and sent to the Packaging Department. The ending Work-in-Process Inventory was 50% complete with respect to conversion costs. Prepare a production cost report for the Recovery Department to show the equivalent units for direct materials and conversion costs. The weighted-average method is used.

Summarize the specific methods used by interest groups in order to influence governmental decisions making in all three branches of government. provide at least two examples from each branch.

The cost of labor is significantly lower in many countries than in the united states. if you move manufacturing to a facility to a country labeled as part of the axis of evil and a threat to world peace you will increase the net income of your client by $10 million per the facility is located in a country which limits personal freedom and engages in state sponsored terrorism. imagine you are a marketing consultant. (a) what would you tell the executives to do? (b) what are the alternatives? what are your recommendations? why do you recommend this course of action?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?