A weekly report for new agents at a vacation sales company is shown in the histogram. A histogram titled Vacation Packages has number of packages sold on the x-axis and number of salespersons on the y-axis. 9 sold 1 to 2 packages; 7 sold 3 to 4; 4 sold 5 to 6; 3 sold 7 to 8; 2 sold 9 to 10; 1 sold 11 to 12; 2 sold 13 to 14; 3 sold 15 to 16. How many of the new agents sold more than 10 vacation packages?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?