Sarah, the owner of Piccadilly Bloom, noticed that the cost of creating boutonnieres during prom season averaged about $8.50 per boutonniere when they sold 150 units as well as when they sold 300 units. Which of the following describes this scenario? a.) Constant scale
b.) Diseconomies of scale
c.) Economies of scale
d.) Both diseconomies and economies of scale

What is the relationship between the national response framework and the national incident management system (nims)? a. the national response framework replaces the nims, which is now obsolete. b. the response protocols and structures described in the national response framework align with the nims, and all nims components support response. c. the nims relates to local, state, and territorial operations, whereas the nrf relates strictly to federal operations. d. the nims and the national response framework cover different aspects of incident management—the nims is focused on tactical planning, and the national response framework is focused on coordination.

As you have noticed, the demand for flip phones has drastically reduced, and there are only a few consumer electronics companies selling them at extremely low prices. also, the current buyers of flip phones are mainly categorized under laggards. which of the following stages of the industry life cycle is the flip phone industry in currently? a. growth stage b. maturity stage c. decline stage d. commercialization stage

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?