Participative leadership is enhanced when:

Policymakers are provided data about the private and social benefits of a good being sold in the market. quantity private mb ($) social mb ($) 6 6 9 7 4 7 8 2 5 9 0 3 what is the size of the externality? if the externality is positive, enter a positive number. if negative, make it a negative number. $ given this data, policymakers must decide whether to address the associated externality with a subsidy or a tax. as their economic consultant, which of the two policy tools would you recommend? a subsidy a tax

The owner of firewood to go is considering buying a hydraulic wood splitter which sells for $50,000. he figures it will cost an additional $100 per cord to purchase and split wood with this machine, while he can sell each cord of split wood for $125. if, for this machine, design capacity is 50 cords per day, effective capacity is 40 cords per day, and actual output is expected to be 32 cords per day, what would be its efficiency?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?