Sienna Company uses the FIFO cost flow assumption. Sienna has inventory with a selling price of $100, packaging costs of $5, and transportation costs of $10. Sienna's normal profit margin is $20. However, due to limited supply of the product from the manufacturer, it would cost Sienna $80 to replace the inventory. What amount should be used as the market value?a. $ 65b. $ 80c. $ 85d. $ 100

Medtronic, inc., is a medical technology company that competes for customers with st. jude medical s.c., inc. james hughes worked for medtronic as a sales manager. his contract prohibited him from working for a competitor for one year after leaving medtronic. hughes sought a position as a sales director for st. jude. st. jude told hughes that his contract with medtronic was unenforceable and offered him a job. hughes accepted. medtronic filed a suit, alleging wrongful interference. which type of interference was most likely the basis for this suit? did it occur here? medtronic, inc., is a medical technology company that competes for customers with st. jude medical s.c., inc. james hughes worked for medtronic as a sales manager. his contract prohibited him from working for a competitor for one year after leaving medtronic

Mr. beautiful, an organization that sells weight training sets, has an ordering cost of $40 for the bb-1 set. (bb-1 stands for body beautiful number 1.) the carrying cost for bb-1 is $5 per set per year. to meet demand, mr. beautiful orders large quantities of bb-1 seven times a year. the stockout cost for bb-1 is estimated to be $50 per set. over the past several years, mr. beautiful has observed the following demand during the lead time for bb-1: demand during lead time probability40 0.150 0.260 0.270 0.280 0.290 0.1total 1.0the reorder point for bb-1 is 60 sets. what level of safety stock should be maintained for bb-1?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?