Problem 7-25 (Algorithmic) George Johnson recently inherited a large sum of money; he wants to use a portion of this money to set up a trust fund for his two children. The trust fund has two investment options: (1) a bond fund and (2) a stock fund. The projected returns over the life of the investments are 9% for the bond fund and 20% for the stock fund. Whatever portion of the inheritance George finally decides to commit to the trust fund, he wants to invest at least 60% of that amount in the bond fund. In addition, he wants to select a mix that will enable him to obtain a total return of at least 8.5%.

If a team of three workers, each making the u.s. federal minimum wage, produced these 12 rugs, what would the total labor cost be? don't forget that these workers would be working overtime.

Profits from using currency options and futures.on july 2, the two-month futures rate of the mexican peso contained a 2 percent discount (unannualized). there was a call option on pesos with an exercise price that was equal to the spot rate. there was also a put option on pesos with an exercise price equal to the spot rate. the premium on each of these options was 3 percent of the spot rate at that time. on september 2, the option expired. go to the oanda.com website (or any site that has foreign exchange rate quotations) and determine the direct quote of the mexican peso. you exercised the option on this date if it was feasible to do so. a. what was your net profit per unit if you had purchased the call option? b. what was your net profit per unit if you had purchased the put option? c. what was your net profit per unit if you had purchased a futures contract on july 2 that had a settlement date of september 2? d. what was your net profit per unit if you sold a futures contract on july 2 that had a settlement date of september 2

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?