The sportswear department had an opening inventory of $95,000 at cost with a markup of 45.5% on March 1. During the month, the buyer for the department purchased additional merchandise with a retail value of $50,000 with a 48% markup. Calculate the cumulative markup percent for March.

What is used by accountant to analyze transactions ?

Which of the following is likely not a benefit of requiring a grand jury to listen to and examine all of the evidence against a person suspected of committing a serious crime and then independently deciding whether or not to hand down an indictment? 1.the grand jury system provides the accused another safeguard against being sent to trial and facing conviction based on flawed evidence. 2.the members of the grand jury are drawn from the community and are empowered to render independent decisions about whether or not the government has collected enough evidence to bring an individual to trial. 3.the grand jury’s decision can provide prosecutors insight into what is necessary to build a sufficient case if a similar crime is presented later. 4.the grand jury is impaneled to rubber-stamp prosecutors’ cases, which makes it possible for more cases to reach trial.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?