The cost approach formula states that reproduction or replacement cost new , equals property value.

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

Which basic economic questions deals with the issue of how the incomeof people in various occupations is determined

4. suppose that pollution in a neighborhood comes from two factories, with marginal benefit curves given by mb1 = 12 – p1 and mb2 = 8 – p2. the level of pollution in the neighborhood is given by p = p1 + p2. the government wants to limit pollution by instituting a pollution-rights market. the government’s desired level of p is 10, so it prints 10 pollution rights and offers them for sale to the firms.a)find the equilibrium selling price of a pollution right, as well as the allocation of rights (and hence pollution levels) across the two factories. b)repeat part (a) for the case where the government’s desired level of pollution equals 14. c)comment on the usefulness of a pollution rights market in achieving efficient levels of pollution abatement.