SkyChefs, Inc., prepares in-flight meals for a number of major airlines. One of the company’s products is grilled salmon in dill sauce with baby new potatoes and spring vegetables. During the most recent week, the company prepared 5,100 of these meals using 2,000 direct labor-hours. The company paid its direct labor workers a total of $28,000 for this work, or $14.00 per hour. According to the standard cost card for this meal, it should require 0.40 direct labor-hours at a cost of $13.50 per hour. Required: 1. What is the standard labor-hours allowed (SH) to prepare 5,100 meals? 2. What is the standard labor cost allowed (SH × SR) to prepare 5,100 meals? 3. What is the labor spending variance? 4. What is the labor rate variance and the labor efficiency variance? (For requirements 3 and 4, indicate the effect of each variance by selecting "F" for favorable, "U" for unfavorable, and "None" for no effect (i. e., zero variance). Input all amounts as positive values. Do no round intermediate calculations.)

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?