uan Pablo and Zak are competitors in a local market. Each is trying to decide if it is better to advertise on TV, on radio, or not at all. If they both advertise on TV, each will earn a profit of $8,000. If they both advertise on radio, each will earn a profit of $14,000. If neither advertises at all, each will earn a profit of $20,000. If one advertises on TV and other advertises on radio, then the one advertising on TV will earn $12,000 and the other will earn $10,000. If one advertises on TV and the other does not advertise, then the one advertising on TV will earn $22,000 and the other will earn $4,000. If one advertises on radio and the other does not advertise, then the one advertising on radio will earn $24,000 and the other will earn $8,000. If both follow their dominant strategy, then Juan Pablo will

Krier industries has just completed its sales forecasts and its marketing department estimates that the company will sell 43,800 units during the upcoming year. in the past, management has maintained inventories of finished goods at approximately 3 months' sales. however, the estimated inventory at the start of the year of the budget period is only 7,300 units. sales occur evenly throughout the year. what is the estimated production level (units) for the first month of the upcoming budget year?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?

How is systematic decision making related to being financially responsible