If a 12 percent increase in the price of Cheerios causes a 17 percent reduction in the number of boxes of cereal demanded, the price elasticity of demand for Cheerios is minus−nothing. (Enter your response rounded to two decimal places.) The demand for Cheerios is inelasticinelastic elasticelastic unit minus elasticunit−elastic.

Abond purchased for $950 was sold for $980 after one year. the interest received during the year is $25. the bond's yield is:

Four key marketing decision variables are price (p), advertising (a), transportation (t), and product quality (q). consumer demand (d) is influenced by these variables. the simplest model for describing demand in terms of these variables is: d = k – pp + aa + tt + qq where k, p, a, t, and q are constants. discuss the assumptions of this model. specifically, how does each variable affect demand? how do the variables influence each other? what limitations might this model have? how can it be improved?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?