G An investor purchases 100 shares of stock at a price of $56.32. The investor writes 3 call options on the stock. The call options cover 100 shares, have a premium of $2.66 and a strike price of $70. Identify the highest break-even point for this overall ratio call write strategy. By 'highest' break-even, this means if multiple break-even points exist, provide as an answer the break-even point that is largest in magnitude. Round your breakeven point to two decimal places.

One question from a survey was "how many credit cards do you currently have? " the results of the survey are provided. complete parts (a) through (g) below. click the icon to view the survey results. (a) determine the mean number of credit cards based on the raw data. the mean is 3.113.11 credit cards. (type an integer or a decimal. do not round.) (b) determine the standard deviation number of credit cards based on the raw data. the standard deviation is 1.9111.911 credit cards. (round to three decimal places as needed.) (c) determine a probability distribution for the random variable, x, the number of credit cards issued to an individual. x (# of cards) p(x) x (# of cards) p(x) 1 0.280.28 6 nothing 2 nothing 7 nothing 3 nothing 8 nothing 4 nothing 9 nothing 5 nothing 10 nothing (type integers or decimals. do not round.)

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?

According to the naeyc curriculum is effective when all of the following occur except