Product A is normally sold for $9.60 per unit. A special price of $7.20 is offered for the export market. The variable production cost is $5.00 per unit. An additional export tariff of 15% of revenue must be paid for all export products. Assume that there is sufficient capacity for the special order. Prepare a differential analysis dated March 16 on whether to reject (Alternative 1) or accept (Alternative 2) the special order. Round your answers to two decimal places. If an amount is zero, enter "0". For those boxes in which you must enter subtracted or negative numbers use a minus sign

Why is the cournot equilibrium an​ equilibrium? a. there are​ short-run barriers to exit in a cournot​ duopoly, so both firms cannot alter their output levels. b. given the other​ firm's level of​ production, both firms are maximizing profits and cannot improve their situation by unilaterally altering their level of output. c. both firms operate at zero profit under a cournot​ equilibrium, so they would face negative profits if they change output. d. both firms operate at minimum​ long-run average cost under a cournot​ equilibrium, so changes to output would reduce​ long-run profits. even if they​ can't collude, why​ don't firms set their outputs at the joint​ profit-maximizing levels​ (i.e., the levels they would have chosen had they​ colluded)? a. given that other firm produces at the collusive​ level, a firm could increase their own profits by increasing output above the collusive level. b. the midpoint of the collusion curve​ (i.e., the collusive​ outcome) lies below the reaction​ curves, so both firms have an incentive to increase output under the cournot duopoly. c. both a and b are correct d. both a and b are incorrect