Compton and Lula are successful stockbrokers working with the Market Beat Brokerage firm. Before buying a company's stock, Compton reviews the company's reports and past data. Lula, on the other hand, buys stock based on speculation. According to the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, the type best describes Compton, and the type best describes Lula.

Quick computing currently sells 12 million computer chips each year at a price of $19 per chip. it is about to introduce a new chip, and it forecasts annual sales of 22 million of these improved chips at a price of $24 each. however, demand for the old chip will decrease, and sales of the old chip are expected to fall to 6 million per year. the old chips cost $10 each to manufacture, and the new ones will cost $14 each. what is the proper cash flow to use to evaluate the present value of the introduction of the new chip? (enter your answer in millions.)

Spartan credit bank is offering 7.5 percent compounded daily on its savings accounts. you deposit $5,900 today. a. how much will you have in the account in 4 years? (use 365 days a year. do not round intermediate calculations and round your answer to 2 decimal places, e.g., 32.16.) b. how much will you have in the account in 12 years? (use 365 days a year. do not round intermediate calculations and round your answer to 2 decimal places, e.g., 32.16.) c. how much will you have in the account in 19 years?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?