2. A deposit of $650 is planned for the end of each year into an account paying 6%/year compounded annually. The deposits were not made for the tenth and eleventh years. All other deposits were made as planned. What approximate amount will be in the account after the deposit at the end of year 25

Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

In the united states, one worker can produce 10 tons of steel per day or 20 tons of chemicals per day. in the united kingdom, one worker can produce 5 tons of steel per day or 15 tons of chemicals per day. the united kingdom has a comparative advantage in the production of:

Consider 8.5 percent swiss franc/u.s. dollar dual-currency bonds that pay $666.67 at maturity per sf1,000 of par value. it sells at par. what is the implicit sf/$ exchange rate at maturity? will the investor be better or worse off at maturity if the actual sf/$ exchange rate is sf1.35/$1.00