The continuous cycle of improving job performance through defining performance, monitoring and evaluating performance, reviewing performance, and providing consequences is known as . development performance appraisal performance management training

6carla would like to buy a dress, a dresser for her bedroom, and a home theater system. she has one month's worth of living expenses in her emergency fund. carla decides to save for the home theater system. did carla make the right decision? why or why not? a. yes; her emergency fund is full and the other items will probably be less expensive. b. yes; she could save more for her emergency fund, but the home theater will be harder to save for. c. no; she should save more for her emergency fund because she has saved less than the recommended amount. d. no; she should have bought the dress and dresser first because she could afford them right away. reset next

The third program provides families with $50 in food stamps each week, redeemable for both perishable and nonperishable food. the fourth policy instead provides a family with a box of nonperishable foods each week, worth $50. use two graphs to illustrate that a family may be indifferent between the two programs, but will never prefer the $50 box of nonperishable foods over the $50 in food stamps. state your answer and use a consumer choice model for perishable food and nonperishable food to graphically justify your choice.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?