A wealthy uncle sent a letter to his nephew. In it the uncle promised $10,000 if his nephew would refrain from drinking, using tobacco, swearing, and playing cards or billiards for money until the age of twenty-five, all of which was otherwise legal for the nephew to do at the time. Would this agreement need to be in writing to satisfy the statute of frauds and be enforced

Gyou plan to deposit $1,700 per year for 5 years into a money market account with an annual return of 2%. you plan to make your first deposit one year from today. what amount will be in your account at the end of 5 years? round your answer to the nearest cent. do not round intermediate calculations. $ assume that your deposits will begin today. what amount will be in your account after 5 years? round your answer to the nearest cent. do not round intermediate calculations.

Review the wbs and gantt chart you created previously. propose three to five additional activities that would you estimate resources and durations. now, identify at least eight milestones for the recreation and wellness intranet project. remember that milestones normally have no duration, so you must have tasks that will lead to completing the milestone. add your activities and milestones to your gantt chart, creating a new gantt chart. estimate the task durations and enter dependencies as appropriate. remember that your schedule goal for the project is six months. copy the gantt chart and network diagram to a word document.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?