Each of two sellers has available one indivisible unit of a good. Seller 1 posts the price p1 and seller 2 posts the price p2. Each of two buyers would like to obtain one unit of the good; they simultaneously decide which seller to approach. If both buyers approach the same seller, each trades with probability 1 ; the disappointed buyer does not subsequently have the option to trade with the other seller. (This assumption models the risk faced by a buyer that a good is sold out when she patronizes a seller with a low price.) Each buyer’s
preferences are represented by the expected value of a payoff function that assigns the payoff 0 to not trading and the payoff 1 − p to purchasing one unit of the good

at the price p. (Neither buyer values more than one unit.) For any pair (p1, p2) of prices with 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1 for i = 1, 2, find the Nash equilibria (in pure and in mixed

strategies) of the strategic game that models this situation. (There are three main

cases: p2 2 p1 − 1, 2 p1 − 1 p2 1 (1 + p1), and p2 > 1 (1 + p1).)

Which of the following statements about brand names is true? brand names give the seller an incentive to provide consistently high-quality products and services in order to protect the reputation of the brand. brand names are always economically wasteful since they dupe consumers into buying more expensive goods and services that are no different from generic versions. it is always rational to prefer brand names over generic substitutes. read the following example and determine whether it illustrates a common critique or defense of advertising. musashi sees a commercial for a brand x clothing company that depicts the wearers of the clothes out having a good time with friends. although he doesn't particularly need new clothes, the commercial prompts him to buy a brand x t-shirt.

5. profit maximization and shutting down in the short run suppose that the market for polos is a competitive market. the following graph shows the daily cost curves of a firm operating in this market. 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 price (dollars per polo) quantity (thousands of polos) mc atc avc for each price in the following table, calculate the firm's optimal quantity of units to produce, and determine the profit or loss if it produces at that quantity, using the data from the previous graph to identify its total variable cost. assume that if the firm is indifferent between producing and shutting down, it will produce. (hint: you can select the purple points [diamond symbols] on the previous graph to see precise information on average variable cost.) price quantity total revenue fixed cost variable cost profit (dollars per polo) (polos) (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) (dollars) 12.50 135,000 27.50 135,000 45.00 135,000 if the firm shuts down, it must incur its fixed costs (fc) in the short run. in this case, the firm's fixed cost is $135,000 per day. in other words, if it shuts down, the firm would suffer losses of $135,000 per day until its fixed costs end (such as the expiration of a building lease). this firm's shutdown price—that is, the price below which it is optimal for the firm to shut down—is per polo.

Ryngard corp's sales last year were $38,000, and its total assets were $16,000. what was its total assets turnover ratio (tato)? a. 2.04b. 2.14c. 2.26d. 2.38e. 2.49