Five construction companies each offer bids on three distinct Department of Transportation (DOT) contracts. A particular company will be awarded at most one DOT contract. a. How many different ways can the bids be awarded? b. Under the assumption that the simple events are equally likely, find the probabilitly that company 2 is awarded a DOT contract. c. Suppose that companies 4 and 5 have submitted non-competitive bids. If the contracts are awarded at

On june 1 of the current year, chad wilson established a business to manage rental property. he completed the following transactions during june: opened a business bank account with a deposit of $28,000 from personal funds. purchased office supplies on account, $2,690. received cash from fees earned for managing rental property, $7,390. paid rent on office and equipment for the month, $3,310. paid creditors on account, $1,230. billed customers for fees earned for managing rental property, $6,130. paid automobile expenses (including rental charges) for the month, $740, and miscellaneous expenses, $370. paid office salaries, $2,330. determined that the cost of supplies on hand was $1,590; therefore, the cost of supplies used was $1,100. withdrew cash for personal use, $2,210. required: 1. indicate the effect of each transaction and the balances after each transaction: for those boxes in which no entry is required, leave the box blank. for those boxes in which you must enter subtractive or negative numbers use a minus sign. (example: -300) answer

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?

Which is not true of birthday and/or annual review automatics? a. the purpose is to trigger a telephone call for a face-to-face meeting.b. quarterly automatic contacts decrease cross-sales and lead to reduced referrals.c. you are expected to stay in touch with all your active prospects and clients through two personal contacts each year?