Abbe, age 56, is married and has two dependent children, one age 14, and the other a 21-year-old full-time student. Abbe has one job, and her husband, age 58, is not employed. If she expects to earn wages of $50,000, file jointly, and take the standard deduction, how many allowances should Abbe claim on her Form W-4a. 7
b. 9
c. 4
d. 5
e. 8

Which of the following best describes biochemical evidence that would not support the modern concept of evolution? a. a bacterium that uses inorganic materials to produce energy b. an organism that does not undergo cellular respiration c. a species of bacteria that is capable of photosynthesis d. an organism that undergoes both aerobic and anaerobic respiration

scenario: hawaii and south carolina are trading partners. hawaii has an absolute advantage in the production of both coffee and tea. the opportunity cost of producing 1 pound of tea in hawaii is 2 pounds of coffee, and the opportunity cost of producing 1 pound of tea in south carolina is 1/3 pound of coffee. which of the following statements is true? a. south carolina should specialize in the production of both tea and coffee. b. hawaii should specialize in the production of tea, whereas south carolina should specialize in the production of coffee. c. hawaii should specialize in the production of coffee, whereas south carolina should specialize in the production of tea. d. hawaii should specialize in the production of both tea and coffee.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?