The terms of trade are acceptable if the price is the seller’s opportunity cost and the buyer’s opportunity cost.

After testing its water, a city water department issues a report to the related citizens, noting what chemicals have been identified, their doses, and the estimated risks of exposure at these levels. this report represents a type of

Ernesto baca is employed by bigg company. he has a family membership in his company's health insurance program. the annual premium is $5,432. ernesto's employer pays 80% of the total cost. ernesto's contribution is deducted from his paycheck. what is his annual contribution? $1,086.40 $1,125.65 $1,527.98 $1,567.20 save and exit

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?