Key considerations involved in planning and conducting multinational operations are affected by:

On january 2, well co. purchased 10% of rea, inc.’s outstanding common shares for $400,000, which equaled the carrying amount and the fair value of the interest purchased in rea’s net assets. well did not elect the fair value option. because well is the largest single shareholder in rea, and well’s officers are a majority on rea’s board of directors, well exercises significant influence over rea. rea reported net income of $500,000 for the year and paid dividends of $150,000. in its december 31 balance sheet, what amount should well report as investment in rea?

Asemiprofessional baseball team near your town plays two home games each month at the local baseball park. they split the concessions 50/50 with the city, but keep revenue from ticket sales for themselves. the city charges the team $100 each month for the three-month season. the team pays the players and manager a total of $1,000 a month. the team charges $10 for each ticket, and the average customer spends $7 at the concession stand. attendance averages 30 people at each home game.in order to break even, how many tickets does the team need to sell for each game? a. 33b. 37c. 41e. 49f. 244

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?