Suppose that a price-taker firm has a marginal cost function given by: mc= 20+0.5q. the firm could join a cartel in its industry and agree to a quota of 5 units. the collusion drives the price of the good from $25.45 to $55.00. suppose that if the firm cheats on the cartel, it has no effect on the price. calculate the producer surplus of this firm when they cheat on the cartel.

Based on an annual disposable income of $40,000, calculate the average amount o money a person would save in japan; in the united states; in france.

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Suppose that two firms produce differentiated products and compete in prices. as in class, the two firms are located at two ends of a line one mile apart. consumers are evenly distributed along the line. the firms have identical marginal cost, $60. firm b produces a product with value $110 to consumers.firm a (located at 0 on the unit line) produces a higher quality product with value $120 to consumers. the cost of travel are directly related to the distance a consumer travels to purchase a good. if a consumerhas to travel a mile to purchase a good, the incur a cost of $20. if they have to travel x fraction of a mile, they incur a cost of $20x. (a) write down the expressions for how much a consumer at location d would value the products sold by firms a and b, if they set prices p_{a} and p_{b} ? (b) based on your expressions in (a), how much will be demanded from each firm if prices p_{a} and p_{b} are set? (c) what are the nash equilibrium prices?