The dogwood technology company managerial accountant computes the may total variance report. the budgeted fixed overhead was $ 47,420 and the standard fixed overhead cost allocated to production was $ 47,220. the actual fixed overhead totaled $ 46,670. compute the fixed overhead budget variance and the fixed overhead volume variance.

Aproduction order quantity problem has a daily demand rate = 10 and a daily production rate = 50. the production order quantity for this problem is approximately 612 units. what is the average inventory for this problem?

Suppose the following items were taken from the balance sheet of nike, inc. (all dollars are in millions.) 1. cash $ 2,316.7 7. inventory $ 2,245.6 2. accounts receivable 2,786.2 8. income taxes payable 80.3 3. common stock 2,841.1 9. equipment 1,783.8 4. notes payable 291.2 10. retained earnings 6,162.5 5. buildings 3,959.7 11. accounts payable 2,624.6 6. mortgage payable 1,092.3 perform each of the following. classify each of these items as an asset, liability, or stockholders’ equity, and determine the total dollar amount for each classification. (enter amounts in millions up to 1 decimal place, e.g. 45.5 million.) cash accounts receivable common stock notes payable buildings mortgage payable inventory income taxes payable equipment retained earnings accounts payable assets $ 13092 liability $ 4088.4 stockholders’ equity $ 9003.6 etextbook and media determine nike’s accounting equation by calculating the value of total assets, total liabilities, and total stockholders’ equity. (enter amounts in millions up to 1 decimal place, e.g. 45.5 million.) total assets = total liabilities + total stockholders’ equity

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?