Afirm practicing third-degree price discrimination may:
i. segment its customers by age, such as offering senior citizen discounts.
ii. charge customers living in certain zip codes a higher price than customers living in other locations.
iii. initially charge high prices and then reduce the price over time to sell to the more price-sensitive consumers.

(a) i
(b) i and ii
(c) ii
(d) i, ii, and iii

Prior to its closing, income summary had total debits of $1,190,500 and total credits of $1,476,300. what purpose is served by the income summary account and what is the nature of the entries that resulted in the $1,190,500 and the $1,476,300? the income summary account is used to the accounts. the $1,190,500 represents the , and the $1,476,300 represents . the company had of $ .

Your family business uses a secret recipe to produce salsa and distributes it through both smaller specialty stores and chain supermarkets. the chain supermarkets have been demanding sizable discounts, but you do not want to drop your prices to the specialty stores. true or false: the robinson-patman act limits your ability to offer discounts to the chain supermarkets while leaving the price high for the smaller stores. true false

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?