Animal world issues ten-year bonds at their face amount of $100 million with the option to call the bonds at $102 million. two years later, interest rates have decreased and animal world decides to call the bonds. the company estimates that over the next eight years, they will save $16 million of cash interest. the journal entry to retire the bonds will include a:

Jason started last week with $900 in his checking account. during the week, he wrote the checks below. at the end of the week, jason received a paycheck for $534.59. he recorded all of these transactions in his check register. trans typ./ check no. date description of transaction payment/ debit deposit/ credit (+) balance 900 00 241 12/4 miller's food market 53.21 53 21 groceries 846 79 242 12/7 frank's auto parts 24.05 24 05 oil and filter 822 74 243 12/8 mike's barber shop 15.00 15 00 haircut 807 74 deposit 12/9 paycheck 534.59 534 59 1,342 33 evaluate jason's check register. a. jason did a good job; everything is correct. b. the final balance is wrong; jason did not add everything correctly. c. jason should have written debit instead of deposit for the transaction type. d. jason entered the amount for his paycheck in the wrong column.

Adding a complementary product to what is currently being produced is a demand management strategy used when: a. capacity exceeds demand for a product that has stable demand.b. price increases have failed to bring about demand management.c. demand exceeds capacity.d. demand exceeds 100 percent.e. the existing product has seasonal or cyclical demand.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?