Maintaining a catalog of services offered, together with binding performance agreements is part of
a. continuity management
b. service level management
c. capacity management
d. availability management

Tiana daniels enterprise’s trial balance as at december 31, 2016 did not balance. on february 15, 2017 the following errors were detected: errorsi. water rates had been undercast by $2, 000.  ii. a cheque paid to yvonne walch of $2, 680 had been posted to the credit side of her account.  iii. discount received total of $1, 260 had been posted to the debit side of the discount allowed account as $1, 620.  iv. rent paid in the amount of $24, 000 had been posted to the credit of the rent received account.  v. wayne returned goods valuing $1, 680 to daniels enterprise but had been completely omitted from the books.    required: 1. prepare the journal entries to correct the errors.  (narrations required)                    14.5 marks  2.    prepare the suspense account showing clearly the original trial balance error.          8 marks

Suppose the number of equipment sales and service contracts that a store sold during the last six (6) months for treadmills and exercise bikes was as follows: treadmill exercise bike total sold 185 123 service contracts 67 55 the store can only sell a service contract on a new piece of equipment. of the 185 treadmills sold, 67 included a service contract and 118 did not.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?