You and your sister are planning a large anniversary party 3 years from today for your parents' 50th wedding anniversary. you have estimated that you will need $4,500 for this party. you can earn 2.5 percent compounded annually on your savings. how much would you and your sister have to deposit today in one lump sum to pay for the entire party?

Recently, verizon wireless ran a pricing trial in order to estimate the elasticity of demand for its services. the manager selected three states that were representative of its entire service area and increased prices by 5 percent to customers in those areas. one week later, the number of customers enrolled in verizon's cellular plans declined 4 percent in those states, while enrollments in states where prices were not increased remained flat. the manager used this information to estimate the own-price elasticity of demand and, based on her findings, immediately increased prices in all market areas by 5 percent in an attempt to boost the company's 2016 annual revenues. one year later, the manager was perplexed because verizon's 2016 annual revenues were 10 percent lower than those in 2015"the price increase apparently led to a reduction in the company's revenues. did the manager make an error? yes - the one-week measures show demand is inelastic, so a price increase will decrease revenues. yes - the one-week measures show demand is elastic, so a price increase will reduce revenues. yes - cell phone elasticity is likely much larger in the long-run than the short-run. no - the cell phone market must have changed between 2011 and 2012 for this price increase to lower revenues.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?

What provides financial support to workers who are retired or have disabilities? medicare social security tax withholdings medicaid