Brief exercises 7-17 through 7-20 require the following information about a joint production process for three products, with a total joint production cost of $100,000. there are no separable processing costs for any of the three products. product sales value at split-off units at split-off 1 2 3 $130,000 50,000 20,000 $200,000 240 960 1,200 2,400

2. high-glow currently produces 1,000 bicycles per month. the following per unit data apply for sales to regular customers: direct materials $50 direct manufacturing labor 5 variable manufacturing overhead 14 fixed manufacturing overhead 10 total manufacturing costs $79 the plant is experiencing demand shortage and is considering reducing production to 800 bicycles. what is the per unit cost of producing 800 bicycles? a) $79 per unit b) $81.50 per unit c) $74 per unit d) $69 per unit

Type of deposit reserve requirementcheckable deposits $7.8 - 48.3 million 3%over $48.3 million 10noncheckable personal savings and time deposits 0refer to the accompanying table. if a bank has $60 million in savings deposits and $40 million in checkable deposits, then its required reserves are$1.2 million.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?