Tracy and brenda are equal partners in crescent home furniture, which is organized as an s corporation. for the year, the company reports sales revenue of $450,000 and business expenses of $195,000. crescent also earns $18,000 in taxable interest and dividend income and $3,300 in tax-exempt interest on its investments. the investment portfolio consists of $45,000 in tax-exempt securities and $110,000 in taxable securities. not included in the business expenses is $3,200 crescent paid as investment interest expense.

Jen heard that the bank where she kept her money was going to close for good. jen said she wasn't worried

Mauro products distributes a single product, a woven basket whose selling price is $15 and whose variable expense is $12 per unit. the company’s monthly fixed expense is $4,200. required: 1. solve for the company’s break-even point in unit sales using the equation method. 2. solve for the company’s break-even point in dollar sales using the equation method and the cm ratio. (do not round intermediate calculations. round "cm ratio percent" to nearest whole percent.) 3. solve for the company’s break-even point in unit sales using the formula method. 4. solve for the company’s break-even point in dollar sales using the formula method and the cm ratio. (do not round intermediate calculations. round "cm ratio percent" to nearest whole percent.)

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?