John and nina, managers at aderton enterprises, want to the check the consistency of results for a performance measure that uses ratings by a supervisor. they want to know if different supervisors would rate the same behavior the same way. in the context of criteria for effective performance management, john and nina are interested in the measure's

(a) validity.
(b) test-retest reliability.
(c) specificity.
(d) interrater reliability.
(e) accountability.

Anewspaper boy is trying to perfect his business in order to maximize the money he can save for a new car. daily paper sales are normally distributed, with a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 10. he sells papers for $0.50 and pays $0.30 for them. unsold papers are trashed with no salvage value. how many papers should he order each day and what % of the time will he experience a stockout? are there any drawbacks to the order size proposed and how could the boy address such issues?

Ummit record company is negotiating with two banks for a $157,000 loan. fidelity bank requires a compensating balance of 24 percent, discounts the loan, and wants to be paid back in four quarterly payments. southwest bank requires a compensating balance of 12 percent, does not discount the loan, but wants to be paid back in 12 monthly installments. the stated rate for both banks is 9 percent. compensating balances will be subtracted from the $157,000 in determining the available funds in part a. a-1. calculate the effective interest rate for fidelity bank and southwest bank. (do not round intermediate calculations. input your answers as a percent rounded to 2 decimal places.) a-2. which loan should summit accept? southwest bank fidelity bank b. recompute the effective cost of interest, assuming that summit ordinarily maintains $37,680 at each bank in deposits that will serve as compensating balances

Suppose the marginal damage and marginal benefit curves in a polluted neighborhood are md = p/3 and mb = 4 – p. also, suppose that transactions costs are low, so that the consumers and the firm can bargain. we saw that in this case, the socially-optimal level of pollution is achieved. start by computing the socially-optimal p. then, for each of the following cases, compute the amount of money transferred through the bargaining process, and indicate who pays whom (i.e., whether consumers pay the firm, or vice versa). also, compute the gains to each party relative to the status quo (i.e., the starting point of the bargaining process).a)consumers have the right to clean air; firm is dominant in the bargaining process.b)consumers have the right to clean air; consumers are dominant in the bargaining process.c)firm has the right to pollute; firm is dominant in the bargaining process.d)firm has the right to pollute; consumers are dominant in the bargaining proces